In 1994, Community House, Inc. (CHI) – a non-profit corporation providing housing services to homeless and low income persons – and the City of Boise, Iowa, entered into a partnership to construct a shelter (called Community House) providing emergency, temporary, and transitional housing for homeless families and individuals. To finance the construction, the City obtained federal funds, while CHI raised money from contributions and secured a loan of $ 657,315 from the Federal Home Loan Bank, which agreed to forgive the loan if CHI provided affordable housing through Community House for 50 years. Under the terms of a Lease Agreement and Operating Agreement between CHI and the City, CHI was to operate the shelter for a term of 50 years, paying the City a rent of $ 1 per year. The City agreed to provide maintenance and repairs. In the event CHI’s right to operate the facility was terminated, the City had the right to purchase CHI’s lease upon repaying the construction loans or obtaining a release of CHI’s liability under such loans. Community House contained both a homeless shelter and a low income housing unit. The homeless shelter could hold, in separate dorms, 66 men and 13 women. There were also ten units for homeless families. The low income, or "transitional" housing, contained 10 family units and 39 single residence apartments. Community House had accommodations for the disabled (physically and mentally), and about 75% of its residents were disabled. In 2004, CHI notified the city that it was facing financial difficulties. Under the terms of a “Management Agreement” executed by the City’s mayor and the Community House Board President, CHI agreed to transfer all of Community House’s assets to the City and agreed to relinquish oversight of Community House. Further, CHI agreed to terminate its existing agreements with the City. In return, the City agreed to take over operations at Community House. Pursuant to its rights under the 1994 Lease Agreement with CHI, the City repaid monies owing to HUD and the Federal Home Loan Bank used to finance construction of the shelter, thereby obtaining a release of liability on behalf of the City and CHI. Eventually, the City and the Boise Rescue Mission (BRM) – a Christian non-profit organization – entered into a lease for the Community House facility. The Lease provided for an initial rent of $ 1 per year and required that the BRM operate an emergency homeless shelter with a capacity to serve not fewer than 66 guests and a soup kitchen. While the Lease itself did not limit the shelter to men, a City Ordinance adopted in 2005 did and the City Resolution approving the lease of Community House to the BRM specifically incorporated the restrictions of said Ordinance. (As indicated in the district court’s opinion on plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, see infra, in the 50 years that the BRM had served the homeless, they had also developed a policy to segregate men and women, and to segregate homeless singles from homeless families.) The Lease also contained an option allowing the BRM to purchase the facility, subject to the conditions of the Lease set forth above. The City closed the Community House facility and on September 14, 2005, the BRM, under the terms of its Lease with the City, took possession of the vacant Community House property. The BRM reopened the facility, providing shelter only to homeless men. The BRM also included a religious component in the services it provided. Plaintiffs in the instant action were CHI and individuals – families, women, and disabled persons – who were forced out of Community House. In addition, plaintiffs included individuals objecting to the religious component of BRM’s services. The defendants were the City and various city officials. After the commencement of the present action, in early 2007, the BRM, exercising its option under the Lease Agreement with the City, purchased the Community House building from the City. The district court, in a decision rendered on October 28, 2005, before BRM purchased the property, denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction allowing the former residents to return to the facility. The district court determined that the plaintiffs had not raised serious questions that the City was discriminating against women, families, or the disabled under the federal Fair Housing Act. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit unanimously concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a preliminary injunction regarding plaintiffs’ disability discrimination claims. However, by a vote of 2 to 1, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction with regard to the men-only policy. The majority found that the men-only policy was facially discriminatory and that plaintiffs had raised serious questions as to whether the City was discriminating against women and families in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The majority found that the city provided little support to establish that the men-only policy benefitted women and families by (i) protecting their safety or by (ii) allowing the BRM to convert one of its other shelters into a shelter exclusively for women and families. But compare the dissent. As stated, the BRM also included a religious component in the services it provided at Community House. Plaintiffs claimed this violated the Establishment Clause. On plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court enjoined the BRM’s practice of requiring residents to attend worship services in order to receive other services. The district court did not preclude the use of Community House by BRM for voluntarily-attended religious programs. The Ninth Circuit, by a vote of 2 to 1, reversed, concluding that the district court should have preliminarily enjoined the conduct of the chapel services and other religious activities at Community House, even if participation in those activities was voluntary. Although the panel majority held that government oversight to ensure that public funding was not being used for religious purposes would not excessively entangle the city with religion, it was of the opinion that plaintiffs made a case for the proposition that BRM’s chapel services at Community House constituted religious indoctrination attributable to the government. It was attributable to the government because the city financially subsidized BRM’s use of the Community House facility by (i) charging BRM a rent of only $ 1 per year for five years for a furnished 34,000 square foot building worth at least $ 2.5 million; by (ii) giving BRM a 20-month option to buy the property for $ 2 million, $ 500,000 less than the minimum value that the City had previously established for the property; and (iii) by insuring the premises and paying for necessary repairs. According to the dissent, it was questionable whether any “aid” flowed from the city to the BRM. According to the dissent, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the lease of Community House somehow enriched BRM. Rather, it appeared that the lease allowed BRM to provide homeless shelters that otherwise would not have existed or would have had to be furnished and paid for by the city. In addition, the dissent was of the opinion that there was no “governmental” religious indoctrination, because, even assuming some financial aid flowed from the City to BRM it was, for constitutional purposes, de minimis. The majority and dissent, in extended discussions, disagreed sharply over the import on Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Helms. Case # 2644 (9th Cir.), affirming in part and reversing in part, Case # 2118 (D. Idaho). Subsequently, the district court, addressing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, held as follows: (1) On plaintiffs’ claim that the City’s lease and eventual sale of the Community House property to the BRM violated the Establishment Clause, the court found that there was sufficient evidence of indoctrination at Community House to withstand defendants’ motion for summary judgment. BRM conducted a daily sixty-minute chapel service before dinner consisting of singing, scripture reading, prayer, testimonies, and preaching. It thus appeared that the BRM was giving instruction in, and imbuing those Community House residents in attendance at the chapel service with the tenets of Christianity. This was true even assuming attendance at the chapel service was voluntary. A trier of fact could conclude that the indoctrination was attributable to the City, because the City only charged the BRM an annual rent of $ 1 for the building and during the lease period the City insured the premises and paid for necessary repairs. Finally, there was evidence, though it was disputed, that the City offered to sell, and eventually sold, the building for less than market value. The summary judgment record did not establish that the sale of the property to the BRM cured any constitutional issues that may have existed as there were disputed facts as to each of the factors which the court had to take into consideration. (2) For the same reasons as applied to plaintiffs’ establishment clause claim, the district court refused to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim that the lease and sale of the Community House property violated the provisions of Idaho Const. Article 1, § 4 and Article 21, § 19. (3) Plaintiffs alleged that by taking and selling CHI’s assets, the City defendants deprived CHI of its property in violation of its procedural due process rights. The district court granted defendants summary judgment dismissing the claim, because the 2004 “Management Agreement” entered into by CHI and the City terminated any property interest that CHI had in Community House. Although the parties disputed whether the CHI Board approved the Management Agreement and whether the CHI Board president had actual or apparent authority to execute the Agreement, the court found that CHI subsequently ratified the Management Agreement. See court’s opinion for details. And even if CHI did not ratify the Agreement, its property interest expired once the City repaid all of the federal loan obligations associated with Community House under the terms of the 1994 Lease Agreement. Thus, by the time that the City sold the Community House property to the BRM, CHI had no property interest in Community House. (4) Plaintiffs were not entitled to rescission of the Management Agreement. (5) The individual City defendants – the Mayor; members of the City Council; and other city officials – were not entitled to legislative immunity or to qualified immunity. See court’s opinion for details. (6) For purposes of plaintiffs’ claims under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Community House property qualified as a “dwelling” under the FHA. See court opinion for details. (7) Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ FHA disparate treatment claim with regard to disabled persons. Plaintiffs’ FHA claim for failure to accommodate disabled persons remained. (8) Plaintiffs made out a prima facie case against the City of facial discrimination on the basis of gender and familial status in violation of the FHA. (9) Defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ FHA claim of discrimination on the basis of religion. There was no evidence of facial religious discrimination under the FHA. While there were allegations that rose to the level of showing that in practice there had been an FHA violation, plaintiffs failed to present any summary judgment evidence to support the allegations of discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of the FHA. (10) On plaintiffs’ claim that, in violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a), defendants engaged in a residential real estate-related transaction with the intent of discriminating against persons in the terms and conditions of such a transaction because of their religion, sex, handicap, and familial status, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied. The court rejected the City’s contentions that (a) the sale of Community House did not involve residential real property for purposes of the FHA and (b) that it was the BRM, not the City, that implemented the men only policy at Community House. (11) On plaintiffs’ claim that the City defendants retaliated against plaintiffs for exercising or aiding another person in the exercise of rights protected by the FHA, there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was a causal link between plaintiffs bringing this action and the City’s sale of Community House to the BRM. (12) The court denied defendants summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim that the City’s lease of the facility to the BRM with the requirement that the property be used as a shelter for single, homeless men only violated the FHA. (13) Plaintiffs displaced from the Community House were not entitled to benefits of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policy Act (URA) making relocation benefits available to persons displaced by federal or federally assisted state projects. The URA did not apply to this case. In addition, plaintiffs were not entitled to relocation benefits pursuant to the Housing and Community Development Act and Home Investment Partnership Act. (14) Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were not mooted as a result of, inter alia, the Community House building being sold to the BRM Case # 3776 (D. Idaho)