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Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act were properly denied because he failed to establish that he suffered from a disability that prevented him from working; nor did plaintiff state a claim for benefits by virtue of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the First Amendment when he claimed his religious faith prevented him from working a regular job, since the Bible teaches one to live by faith in Jesus for all things spiritual and material Case # 717 (S.D.N.Y.)
Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew claiming that his religious beliefs precluded his allowing his picture to be taken, alleged that the State of Oklahoma and the Administrative Officer for the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by refusing to renew his non-photo commercial driver’s license (CDL). Plaintiff sought relief in the form of (1) unemployment benefits (2) an injunction requiring the Administrative Officer to renew his non-photo CDL, and (3) additional monetary damages for harm sustained as a result of defendants’ refusal to renew his CDL. Held, inter alia: (1) The claims against the State and its agencies, were barred by the State’s sovereign immunity. (2) Plaintiff’s claims for retroactive unemployment compensation and monetary damages, insofar as they related to the Administrative Officer in his official capacity, were also barred. (3) Plaintiff’s claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Administrative Officer in his individual capacity in the form of renewal of his non-photo CDL fell within the Ex parte Young exception and was not barred by the State’s sovereign immunity. (4) The Administrative Officer had qualified immunity in his individual capacity from plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief given that he was acting pursuant to a statute whose unlawfulness was far from apparent Case # 2655 (E.D. Okla.)
Employee, who after 5 years, began to observe Saturday as the Sabbath, held to have voluntarily left his work for good cause when the employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation of his religion-based request to have Saturday’s off. The employee was entitled to unemployment benefits Case # 2022 (Ark. Ct. App.)
Claimant’s former employer – founded by a group of churches to provide assistance to those in need – was not exempt from the Colorado Employment Security Act and claimant was entitled to apply for unemployment benefits. Claimant’s employer did not qualify an organization that operated primarily for religious purposes which was operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches. Claimant’s employer had been founded by a group of churches to provide assistance to the unemployed, those suffering from long term illness, or experiencing other forms of personal crisis by providing, food, clothing and other items and by providing shelter, automotive/fuel, childcare, medical assistance, etc. The participating churches contributed financial support, volunteers, tangible goods and on-going prayers. The employer was located in a church, its board of directors was composed of church representatives, a large image of Jesus and crosses decorated the employer’s walls, Bibles were available on the shelves of its food bank, and each client was given a brochure which included a Bible verse. Nevertheless, the employer did not qualify as an organization that operated primarily for religious purposes. The word “operated” connotes activity, the type of activity actually engaged in, rather than the motivation and impetus for the activity. The primary purpose or primary activity carried out by the employer was the provision of assistance services to those in need, regardless of their religious affiliation or beliefs. Although the employer did not hide the religious motivation behind its charitable work – on the contrary, its religious leanings were publicized in its literature, location, and displayed iconography – it operated primarily to perform charitable work to disadvantaged individuals. Such work, while often tied to religious organizations, was no different from the charitable work performed by countless secular entities. In addition, the employer was a separate legal entity from the churches that founded it and a separate legal entity that is not operated “primarily for religious purposes” is not subject to the exemption, despite affiliations it may have with religious organizations Case # 4440 (Colo. App.)
A mission was not entitled to an exemption from unemployment insurance assessments under Delaware law. (1) The mission did not qualify as a “church.” The worship services it did hold were secondary in importance to the secular assistance it provided to the impoverished members of the community, serving as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves. (2) Focusing on the secular activities engaged in by the paid staff (the provision of food, shelter, employment, and substance abuse rehabilitation for the impoverished), rather than the optional religious services provided by the mission, the conclusion was that the mission was not an organization operated “primarily for religious purposes.” Nor was the mission operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches. The mission may have been assisted by other religious institutions or their members through contributions of money, services and/or resources, however, such activity appeared not to have been the principal support of the mission or determined how the mission was operated or by whom. See court’s opinion for further details Case # 3731 (Del. Super. Ct. 2009)
Employer did not qualify for the exemption from the unemployment insurance code which Florida state law affords a church, an association of churches or an organization operated primarily for religious purposes operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or association of churches Case # 21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
Employee of daycare center was not entitled to unemployment compensation because the daycare center was “operated and controlled by” a church for religious purposes. In unemployment compensation proceedings, the appeals referee is the finder of fact, and both the appellate court and Unemployment Appeals Commission (UAC) must accept the findings of the appeals referee unless those findings are not based on competent, substantial evidence. Here the UAC committed error in ignoring the findings of the appeals referee. The UAC argued it was entitled to reject the finding that the daycare was operated for religious purposes, because it was a legal conclusion. However, an agency cannot circumvent the requirements of the statute by characterizing findings of fact as legal conclusions. Florida law Case # 2098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
Employee worked as a childcare giver for a separately incorporated child care center, which was located on church property and operated by the church. Subsequently, the center was dissolved and taken over directly by the church. The employee was then directly employed by the church. When the employee’s employment was terminated by the church she was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. Services performed in the employ of: (a) a church or convention or association of churches, or (b) an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches are not covered by unemployment insurance. There was no question that the church was an excluded employer. And so was the child care center, when the employee worked directly for the center, prior to its dissolution. The center was primarily subsidized by the church and under the facts was operated primarily for religious purposes Case # 2390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
Appellant Cathedral Arts Project, Inc., a nonprofit corporation incorporated by the Chancellor of St. John’s Cathedral, was not exempt from the Florida Unemployment Compensation Tax. To qualify for the exemption an organization must (1) be operated “primarily” for religious purposes and (2) operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or a convention or association of churches. Appellant met the second requirement. It was controlled by a church, because its Board, although overwhelmingly consisting of lay members, was elected by the Rector, Wardens, and Vestry of St. John’s Cathedral. However, a divided Florida District Court of Appeal held that Appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that it was operated “primarily” for religious purposes. In response to cutbacks in performing and visual arts instruction in public elementary schools, Appellant was by founded by St. John’s Cathedral for the purpose of providing an arts program within the public schools for youngsters who would otherwise be deprived of such educational opportunity. One of Appellant’s general purposes set forth in its Articles of Incorporation was to create spiritual enrichment and personal growth through the promotion and support of the arts in Jacksonville, Florida and surrounding communities. It did so by providing instruction in the arts, which included dance and music, in the public schools and in after-school programs. Although Appellant was created to be an outreach ministry, the administrative hearing officer determined that Appellant’s primary purpose was the promotion and support of the arts in Jacksonville and surrounding communities by providing instruction to students in public schools and in after-school programs. The District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Court’s standard of review as to this issue was whether the administrative hearing officer’s findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence and the Court found that although Appellant’s motivation may have been religious in nature, competent, substantial evidence supported the administrative finding that Appellant’s primary purpose in operating was to give art instruction to underprivileged children. Whether or not the Court would have found differently had no bearing on its decision. The dissent believed that rather than focusing on the “primary purpose” of the organization, the majority mistakenly focused solely upon the service delivered. According to the dissent, the legal question under the statute’s language is “why” the organization provides the service, not “what” the organization provides. In the dissent’s view, spiritual enrichment of the lives of underprivileged children was Appellant’s primary purpose, which it achieved via instruction in dance, music, and the arts. According to the dissent, the outcome in this case created an intolerable “Catch-22” for Cathedral Arts and all other ministries that reach out in support of the underprivileged the public schools or other public institutions. On the one hand, the majority concluded that Cathedral Arts’ purpose was not religious enough to qualify for the statutory exemption. On the other hand, if Cathedral Arts were to be overly zealous and religious in the service provided, its services for disadvantaged students in the public schools would be declared unconstitutional. The dissent was of the opinion that the majority opinion was inconsistent in finding that the Church – St. John’s Cathedral – controlled Appellant Cathedral Arts, but that Appellant did not operate with a primarily religious purpose. Cathedral Arts, being an outreach ministry created by St. John’s Cathedral was an arm of the Church with a purpose that was no less religious than that of the Church itself. In reply, the Court majority wrote that, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, its analysis was not focused solely upon the service delivered by Appellant, but on whether competent, substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that Appellant’s primary purpose was to promote and support the arts in Jacksonville and surrounding communities by providing instruction to students in public schools and in after-school programs. Rather than focusing on said the question, the dissent wrongly focused on Appellant’s motivation, failing to recognize that the Legislature, had it wished to exempt all religious outreach ministries from unemployment taxation, could have easily done so by expressly providing that any outreach ministry, any organization that is operated for religious purposes, or any organization having a religious motivation is exempt. Moreover, even if, as the dissent contended, the question under the statute’s language is “why” the organization provides a service, the evidence in this case supported the hearing officer’s finding that Appellant’s primary purpose in providing instruction to students was to promote and support the arts. Whether or not the Court would have found differently had no bearing on the appeal from the administrative decision in this case Case # 4565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
It was error to deny unemployment compensation benefits to claimant after he lost his job at a thrift store operated by the Salvation Army on the ground that the Salvation Army was an organization operated primarily for religious purposes and operated by a church, because there was no substantial competent evidence supporting said finding. Florida law Case # 4592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.)
Plaintiff employee was responsible for keeping the church and sacristy clean. She was discharged for insubordination when she objected to a diocesan program wherein children would view a movie, “Talking About Touching,” and participate in discussions concerning inappropriate physical contact. Plaintiff admitted to calling her cousin’s daughter and asking her to call other parents to remind them that they could opt out of the program and admitted to telling the pastor that she would “lay down her life to make sure that the program didn’t get shown to the students.” The Illinois Appellate Court held that denial of plaintiff’s claim for unemployment insurance benefits was clearly erroneous. To disqualify an employee from receiving unemployment compensation, an employer must establish (1) that there was a “deliberate and willful” violation of a rule or policy of the employer; (2) said rule or policy was reasonable; and (3) that the violation of the rule or policy had harmed the employer or was repeated by the employee despite previous warnings. The reasonable rule or policy a claimant must violate is one “governing the individual’s behavior in performance of his work.” Not every violation of an employer’s rule will constitute misconduct. There must be some nexus between the rule and the employment. The reasonableness of the rule or policy at issue in the present case was not the diocese’s program on inappropriate touching, but the requirement that employees act in accordance with the policy and that employees such as plaintiff refrain from actively challenging the program. The Court found that, although said rule or policy was reasonable, the evidence did not establish that plaintiff actually violated the rule or policy after being warned not to express opposition to the program on inappropriate touching. But even assuming the existence of an evidentiary basis for a finding of a violation, it could not be concluded from the record that plaintiff’s conduct was performed willfully and deliberately. And finally, the evidence did not support a finding that any violation of the rule or policy by plaintiff harmed the employer. There was no evidence suggesting that implementation of the program was at any time delayed, disrupted or derailed by the actions of plaintiff, or any other individual. Plaintiff had also argued that denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a worker based on conduct that is “rooted in religion” violates the First Amendment. However, the Court found it unnecessary to address the issue Case # 3375 (Ill. App. Ct.)
Maine’s Unemployment Insurance Commission denied benefits to plaintiff based on its finding, pursuant to 26 Me. Rev. Stat. § 1043(11)(F)(21)(a), that plaintiff’s employer, the Maine Sea Coast Missionary Society, was an organization operated primarily for religious purposes and was principally supported by an association of churches. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that although the Commission did not err in concluding that the Mission was operated primarily for religious purposes, the findings of the Commission that the Mission was principally supported by an association of churches were not sufficiently clear. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the Commission so that it could clarify its decision. Court provides good discussion of the evidentiary facts that must support the Commission’s findings as to each element Case # 2595 (Me.)
Maimonides School, whose corporate purposes included maintaining a place of worship according to Orthodox Jewish rites and instructing Jewish students in the teachings of Orthodox Judaism, was exempt from the State unemployment tax as “an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is . . . principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151A, § 6(r). Clearly, the school was an organization “operated primarily for religious purposes.” The question was whether it was “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” The term “church” included non-Christian organized religious bodies. Maimonides, a Jewish school, was not “controlled” by a hierarchical religion. Nevertheless it met the statutory requirements for exemption from unemployment tax contributions. To qualify as an exempt employer, a separately incorporated religious institution need not be “operated,” “supervised,” or “controlled,” by a church. An organization operated primarily for religious purposes may qualify for exemption if it is merely “principally supported” by a “church or convention or association of churches.” Because Maimonides was “principally supported” by Jewish religious organizations, it satisfied the statutory exemption. Maimonides was largely self-governing. But the school was grounded in the Jewish religion and derived substantial support from area synagogues and other Jewish organizations. The school recruited from area synagogues the students who paid the tuition and fees that accounted for a significant part of the school’s operating budget. Maimonides relied on members of surrounding Jewish synagogues to operate the school: the board of directors and school committee both included rabbis and members from local synagogues. The school required that rabbis, presumably drawn from local Jewish synagogues, head the elementary and high schools, as well as the synagogue on its premises. Teachers providing religious instruction were Orthodox Jews, also presumably drawn from local synagogues. The school raised funds from local synagogues, as well as from Combined Jewish Philanthropies, which was itself an organization that raised and distributed funds to Jewish institutions such as Maimonides. The school’s existence depended upon these essential relationships with members of other temples, synagogues and Jewish organizations, to provide financial and moral support Case # 2378 (Mass.)
Five months after beginning work, a Seventh-Day Adventist, informed her employer that she could no longer work Saturdays because that was her Sabbath day. Previously, claimant had regularly worked Saturdays, but decided to discontinue the practice. Claimant was entitled to unemployment compensation. Case decided solely on statutory grounds. Michigan law Case # 2161 (Mich. Ct. App.)
Even though a church’s employment manual indicated that unemployment benefits might be available to church employees separated from employment through no fault of their own, and even though the relator lost her job as business administrator with the church through no fault of her own, she was not entitled to unemployment benefits because (1) the relator’s employment with the church was “noncovered employment,” (2) the church did not elect to have the employment deemed covered employment, and (3) the relator was not entitled to an equitable allowance of unemployment benefits. Under Minnesota law, employment for a church that is operated primarily for religious purposes under IRC § 501(c)(3) and which has tax-exempt status under IRC § 501(a) is “noncovered employment.” However, a church may elect to have employment performed for it considered covered employment, and the commissioner has the discretion to approve such election. Here, however, the church did not elect to do so. Further, while the church’s employment manual indicated incorrectly that unemployment benefits might be available to church employees separated from employment through no fault of their own, representations by an employer regarding eligibility for unemployment benefits are not binding on the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). There was no requirement that the church post notices or inform its employees that they did not have the right to unemployment benefits. The fact that the employer and employee paid other taxes such as income, medicare and social security taxes was irrelevant to whether the employer had to pay unemployment taxes. Finally, the relator could not prevail on her argument that she should receive unemployment benefits as a matter of equity simply because she lost her job through no fault of her own Case # 3945 (Minn. Ct. App.)
Muslim woman had good cause to refuse to accept her former employer’s offer to return to work under the same terms and conditions as her previous position. Although her religiously motivated refusal to wear pants to work violated the employer’s client's dress code policy, which the client enacted for safety reasons, no evidence was presented to show that the type of policy enforced by the client at its work site was widely followed elsewhere or was mandated by some state or local regulation. And there was insufficient evidence that wearing a long skirt would create an unreasonable burden on the former employee’s ability to perform her normal and usual assembly or packaging job duties within the workplace, other than with this one particular client's account, or cause an unreasonable hardship for employers as a whole. Thus, the employer failed to show that its client's policy was a "generally applicable and otherwise valid regulatory law" or that it was necessary to public safety. Nor did the employer explain why it was unable to accommodate the former employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs by offering her some other type of work with another client that would not have interfered with her beliefs 1650N (Minn. Ct. App.)
Claimant was collecting partial unemployment compensation benefits while employed through a temporary employment agency; in one particular week he did not work one day because he attended the funeral of his brother- in-law, who did not reside in the same household as did claimant; although claimant worked the remainder of the week, he was properly denied unemployment benefits for the entire week under the terms of New Jersey’s Unemployment Compensation Law; claimant’s free exercise of religion right was not violated; nor was there a violation of equal protection, although the statute did not penalize a claimant absenting himself for availability for work owing to attendance of the funeral of deceased persons who satisfied the statutory definition of “immediate family member” Case # 959 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.)
Unemployment insurance denied claimant who advised homosexual patients that they were sinners and would go to hell and that tattoos were signs of the Devil Case # 754 (N.Y. App. Div.)
Claimant agreed to work on Sundays when she was hired. Thereafter she became an active member in her church and, as a result, asked her employer for a schedule change that would eliminate her having to work on Sundays. When the employer failed to accommodate her request, claimant stopped working. Held, claimant was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits Case # 2781 (N.Y. App. Div.)
Claimant was properly denied unemployment insurance benefits; his employment was terminated due to misconduct, as he knew or should have known that continued injection of his religious beliefs in the workplace could lead to his termination Case # 514 (N.Y. App. Div.)
Claimant, employed by church operated day care center, was not excluded from eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits; employee’s duties were not “for the performance of duties of a religious nature” even though children were supposed to say grace before meals and engage in Bible study and religious singing Case # 486 (N.Y. App. Div.)
Employee at Orthodox Jewish nursing home discharged, inter alia, for bringing in non-kosher food into the facility in violation of work rules entitled to unemployment insurance benefits Case # 403 (N.Y. App. Div.)
Because the organization for which appellant worked, school was operated “primarily” for religious purposes and was operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church, she was not entitled to unemployment compensation; meaning of the word “primarily” Case # 568 (Ohio Ct. App.)
Plaintiff’s termination and the denial of his application for unemployment benefits did not violate his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. For years plaintiff, who worked Sunday through Thursday as a manager, was allowed to work from home on Sundays from where he would monitor the employer’s drivers via phone. Working from home allowed plaintiff to also perform nonwork-related tasks and to attend church, which he attended on an irregular basis. Owing to changing client demands, the employer insisted that plaintiff be present on Sundays at the workplace from 6:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. Based upon his continuing refusal to work the new schedule assigned to him, plaintiff was discharged. Plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the revised Sunday work schedule impermissibly interfered with his ability to attend church on Sundays in violation of the free exercise clause. Plaintiff offered no evidence on how the new work schedule infringed upon his constitutional right to freely engage in his religion, other than stating that he irregularly attended church on Sunday. There was no evidence describing the tenets of plaintiff’s religion, the sincerity of his religious beliefs, whether Sunday church service was integral to his religious practices, and no evidence that no alternative means of worship were available such as services only being offered during his working hours on Sunday. Moreover, there was no indication that plaintiff informed his employer that the new schedule would interfere with his religious practices. An employee’s failure to inform his employer of his religious needs and to assist in the accommodation process may be fatal to the right of the employee to have his beliefs accommodated by his employer and may constitute a waiver of such right Case # 4162 (Ohio Ct. App.)
Oregon Revised Statute § 657.072(1)(b) excluded from unemployment compensation benefits (1) a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed minister of a church engaged in the ministry and (2) a member of a religious order engaged in the exercise of duties required by such order. Because the statute did not exclude from coverage other religious leaders not ordained by churches, the statute violated Article I, §§ 2, 3, and 20, of the Oregon Constitution by creating distinctions between religious faiths. The solution was to treat all religious leaders the same. For purposes of the Oregon Constitution, this could be accomplished by excluding all religious leaders from entitlement to unemployment benefits, not just those ordained by a church. Initially Oregon took this tack by adopting an administrative rule broadening the “ministerial exemption” under ORS 657.072(1)(b) from including only ministers licensed by “churches” to also including ministers licensed by “religious organizations.” However, this approach soon became impractical. This was so because employers could offset as much as 90% of their federal unemployment tax obligation by paying into a qualified state unemployment compensation program, but only if the state unemployment compensation program did not exempt more workers from coverage than were exempt under the federal program. However, federal law limited the exclusion from the federal unemployment compensation program to ministers licensed or ordained by only “churches.” USC § 3309(b)(1) (1988). Hence, by excluding ministers licensed by any religious organization from coverage of its unemployment insurance program, Oregon was excluding more workers from coverage than were exempt under the federal program, thereby losing the federal tax benefit for Oregon employers. To comply with both federal law and the equal treatment requirements of the Oregon Constitution, Oregon adopted a new administrative rule which entitled all duly ordained, commissioned or licensed clergy to apply for unemployment compensation. This new regulation, requiring all clergy to be covered by the state unemployment insurance program was challenged by a church-employer as constituting an infringement on its First Amendment rights. The Oregon Supreme Court, affirming a Court of Appeals’ decision held that the state’s scheme of entitling all employees of a religious institution and all duly ordained, commissioned or licensed clergy to apply for unemployment compensation did not violate the free exercise rights of the employing religious institution. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part by holding that a claimant is not entitled to an award of interest on unemployment compensation benefits Case # 2441 (Ore.), affirming in part and reversing in part, Case # 487 (Or. Ct. App.)
Unemployment compensation fund. Church unsuccessfully argued its “evangelist” or teacher, was not an employee of the church since the church had no governing body, exercised "very little control" over the evangelist’s work, and paid him only the tithes received from members, not a wage or salary. The evangelist did not qualify as an independent contractor. Requiring the church to file regular reports with the state employment department did not violate its constitutional rights of free exercise and free expression. Church did not assert a colorable free expression claim and, as a result, its hybrid rights claim, arguably requiring strict scrutiny, could not succeed. Oregon law Case # 1151 (Or. Ct. App.)
Clergy performing services in the exercise of ministry not entitled to unemployment benefits Case # 116 (Pa. Commw. Ct.)
Jehovah’s Witness who voluntarily left her job was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits because she failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she had a “necessitous and compelling” reason for quitting her employment based on her sincerely held religious belief prohibiting her from celebrating birthdays. The employer, a Jewelry store, wished to send cards to customers wishing them a “Happy Birthday” and urging them to stop in and have jewelry cleaned and polished. Claimant, a salesperson, claimed she was instructed to write a “personal” message on the cards being sent to customers so as to personalize the card. Plaintiff objected on the ground that although she “understood that the cards were for a general advertisement . . . , when it came to personally writing the cards, . . . putting my own thoughts and my . . . own handwriting inside the cards, . . . my conscience drew the line.” Claimant failed to meet her burden because she failed to describe the particular “personal message” she claimed the employer was insisting that she write and how that message would violate her religious beliefs Case # 4130 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct.)
Discharged employee who had disobeyed the employer’s direction to pack inserts in customers’ orders which the employee found religiously objectionable was properly denied unemployment benefits. Plaintiff testified that the inserts were advertisements for book, music, and movie distributors who sold media that promoted witchcraft, satanic worship, drugs, homosexuality, and violence. Plaintiff was willing to work only in an area that did not deal with the advertising inserts in any way, but there was testimony that this would be virtually impossible, because these materials were handled in every part of the plant Case # 1670N (Tenn. Ct. App.)
The wages of petitioner’s employee were subject to unemployment insurance contributions. Although the Utah Code exempt’s employment by “a church or convention or association of churches” from its unemployment insurance program, it does so only if the employer is also exempt from taxation under federal law. Here the alleged religious employer failed to furnish documentation establishing an IRS determination that it met the necessary requirements to be considered a tax exempt religious organization. Petitioner failed to either provide documentation of the alleged religious employer’s I.R.C. § 501 status or to independently establish its entitlement to tax-exempt status under the applicable statutory requirements Case # 4330 (Utah Ct. App.)
Exemption of the Salvation Army from paying unemployment compensation benefits constitutional Case # 83 (Wash. Ct. App.)
Muslim claimed she had good cause to reject a suitable job offer, and was therefore entitled to continued unemployment compensation, because of the necessity to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. The court reversed the labor commission’s finding of a lack of good cause because the legal conclusion of lack of good cause was not supported by the facts in the record. The case was remanded so that the commission could make further factual findings and conclusions related to application of the good-cause standard provided in WIS. STAT. § 108.04(8), and to address any constitutional issues that may be raised by the commission’s application of the good-cause standard in rejecting the claim for unemployment benefits by a person required by her religion to go on a pilgrimage Case # 1925 (Wisc. Ct. App.)
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